The Ultimate Solution to Electoral Reform in Canada

Yes indeed, I do have the ultimate solutions to all of our electoral system problems and I will share them with all of you. Now some of you might think this is too comprehensive and complicated to propose all at once, but for voters it will be just a simple two step process and will eliminate the most difficult part of the voting process.

We need to do this fully and comprehensively because people have a reluctance towards change when it comes to our electoral system. They are not going to want to make multiple incremental changes. We have to do it once and we have to do it right.

The Problem

My proposals are aimed at solving the most important flaws in the process, those that make it undemocratic:

• - the pressure for people to vote strategically, rather than for their actual preference, to try to avoid the next two factors
• - the possibility, and likelihood in many cases, for the last choice of most voters to get elected because of "vote splitting" among like-minded voters
• - a House of Commons whose party seat distribution does not reflect the popular vote
• - an unelected, unaccountable and unnecessary Senate

The Solution

My proposals are based on these principles:

• - maintaining the constituency representative system as the main basis of House of Commons membership
• - eliminating the need and pressure for strategic voting
• - a House of Commons whose membership, by party representation, reflects the total popular vote
• -solving the Senate problem

A Constituency Representative Based System

The vast majority of Members of the House of Commons would be elected, as they are now, as constituency representatives. But, to avoid the necessity for strategic voting and the possibility of the least popular rather than most popular candidate being elected, a transferable vote system will be used where voters rate the candidates in preferential order, rating as many or few candidates as they wish.

A House of Commons Reflecting The Popular Vote

In order to ensure the party representation in the House of Commons reflects the popular votes a number of seats will be added to the House of Commons, and the members selected from party lists in a manner that brings the overall party representation equal to the popular vote.

This will be done by having voters select a party preference separate from a candidate preference.

The Numbers and Solving The Senate Problem

Looking at the last federal election we see that with 308 constituency representatives we have to add 107 Members of Parliament from party lists to get a fully representative House of Commons. However we can actually do this without adding any additional federal representatives by eliminating the Senate and the 100 Senators and limiting the number of constituency representatives to 300 and the number of list representatives to 100. This might not always enable adjustments to get the party representation fully equivalent but certainly enough to prevent any one party from forming a majority government without a majority of the popular vote. Note that current plans call for increasing the size of the House of Commons to 338 while retaining the Senate.

And yes eliminating the Senate may seem like an impossible task but all that it really requires is political will and is making our government truly democratic not worth finding that political will.

The End of Strategic Voting

The two new parts of the system - transferable votes and separate votes for party representation remove the most difficult part of the voting process - the antagonizing decision by voters on whether to vote strategically, an act that is itself undemocratic. Voters should be able to vote for the candidate and party of their choice and not feel that they have to vote against someone or some party to avoid the worst of all possible outcomes.

The transferable vote allows voters to rank their preferences so that in the end everyone gets to choose between the two candidates left on the ballot and no one loses their vote.

The separate vote for party representation means that no matter how votes divide up by constituency the parties representation in the House of Commons reflects their support nationwide.

These provisions also allow voters to choose independent candidates as their constituency representative without losing their ability to affect the party representation in the House of Commons.

Municipal and Provincial Elections

The transferable vote provisions are ones that should also be adopted in municipal elections. Since most municipal elections do not involve political parties the likelihood of many candidates with similar views running is even greater than in federal and provincial elections and the pressure to vote against the least desirable (rather than for the most desirable) candidate is even greater. A transferable vote prevents the last choice of most voters from being elected due to vote splitting because in the end everyone gets to choose between the two candidates left on the ballot and no one loses their vote.

The full proposal (except for elimination of the Senate) could also be adopted and adapted for provincial elections.

Representation by Population and Community Representation

One of the effects of our attempt to maintain representation by population (rep by pop) as much as possible without even further enlarging the geographic size of rural and remote constituencies has been the continual increase in the number of Members of Parliament. Current plans call for the House of Commons to increase from 308 to 338 with no end in sight.

One of the things that the separate ballot for party representation will ensure is that the House of Commons party representation reflects the popular vote of voters. This makes pure representation by population, which we have never had, somewhat less important and enables us to put more focus on making constituency representatives community representatives.

To achieve this we should put a limit on the number of Members of Parliament at 300 constituency MPs and 100 list MPs. We should also redraw constituencies, taking rep by pop into account as much as possible, making constituency boundaries more consistent with actual community boundaries as well as keeping geographic size manageable for an MP to represent. We should retain these configurations for much longer periods so these new community reflecting constituencies do not change with every election.

We should also retain PEI at 4 constituency MPs and Quebec at 75 constituency MPs for historical reasons.

We have to recognize, of course, that the list MPs will come from across Canada and are not necessarily going to accurately reflect rep by pop, though I suspect they may be more urban than rural somewhat correcting the effect of limiting rural and remote constituency geographic sizes.

There is going to be, as there always has been, a trade-off between rep by pop and ensuring effective representation for less densely populated parts of the country. However with the separate vote for party preference based on popular vote that becomes less of a problem.

The Benefits of List Representatives

There has always been criticism of the concept of having Members of Parliament selected from party lists but there are also significant benefits of it beyond ensuring that the House of Commons party representation reflects the popular vote.

We have to remember, that just as voters take into account candidates party affiliation when choosing a constituency MP, voters will also take into account who the parties have placed on their lists when choosing a party preference. Thus the parties will need to be mindful of this when drawing up their lists.

One aspect that might be criticized is parties placing people who could not get elected as individual MPs on the list. I think that is a good thing. There are undoubtedly many competent qualified people capable of doing an excellent job as an MP who would be a complete failure as a political candidate. It would not hurt to have some MPs who are lousy as "political operatives" in the House of Commons.

It might also not hurt to have MPs who are less partisan in the House of Commons and I would encourage political parties to place capable candidates that might not be card carrying members but share the parties philosophies on their lists.

There is a question as to whether parties should be allowed to place individuals who are seeking election as constituency representatives on the list. While I understand that parties might want to "protect" key candidates it is somewhat offensive that candidates rejected by their constituency voters could end up in the House of Commons (somewhat like appointing failed candidates to the Senate).

Towards a New Co-operative and Democratic House of Commons

Most individual voters would probably say that they want a majority government led by (and composed only of) the party they support. But what do the voters collectively want. It is rare that a majority of voters votes for one political party and when they do the seat representation is far from proportional to the popular vote.

The last time Canadian voters gave one party over 50% of popular votes was in 1958 when Diefenbaker's Tories received 53.7 % of the votes and 78.5 % of the seats, although Mulroney's Tories received 50% of the votes and 74.8% of the seats in 1984. (Source: Canadian Election Results: 1867-2006)

We usually get majority governments, not because we vote for them but, because of how our political system is structured.

This proposed new electoral system will ensure that voters get the representation they want and will almost always reflect the fact that their is a wide variety of political preferences in our country.

We might all be very surprised by how much better a governing process and government we get if our elected representatives are forced by the voters to actually compromise and work together without one party, or even one man, controlling the agenda.

Although we have become used to it, an "elected dictatorship" is not necessarily the best way to run a country.

Municipal Elections Suck

So why do municipal elections suck.

Because the way the system works now all too often the least preferred candidate wins rather than the most preferred candidate.

This results from the fact that there are often a large number of candidates, many of whom may share a similar philosophy and similar policies and who appeal to the same group of voters. For simplicity sake lets divide the candidates (and voters) into alphas and betas, for want of better terms.

Various scenarios can come into play here but for demonstration purposes lets look at a simple one. Let us say there are three alpha candidates that share 60% of the vote roughly and one beta candidate with 40% of the vote. Let us assume, reasonably, that the beta candidate is the last choice of almost all of the alpha voters. And let us assume, also reasonably, that while all the alpha voters may have individual preferences all the alpha candidates are acceptable to almost all of the alpha voters.

Under our present electoral system the beta candidate, the last choice of the majority of voters and the one acceptable to only a minority of voters would get elected. Similar situations can happen with different numbers of candidates and different breakdowns with either beta or alpha candidates benefiting from the flaw in the system.

Another effect of this of course is that people realize this is happening and "strategic voting" comes into play and voters attempt to avoid this by voting for their second or third choices instead of their first, depending on who the media says has the best chance of winning. Such a situation deprives voters of the ability to vote for their first choice and gives the media an inordinate (and undemocratic) amount of power in choosing who gets elected.

There is an alternative - system that allows voters to vote for their first choice amongst acceptable candidates and not vote for unacceptable candidates. Instead of voting for one candidate you would rank the candidates in order of preference, ranking as many candidates as you wish and avoiding ranking unacceptable candidates if you do not wish to. The votes would be tabulated electronically dropping the bottom candidates from the list and redistributing their votes to the voters next choice until a candidate receives over 50% of the vote.

Under this system the least preferred candidate would never be elected and the elected candidate would always be acceptable to the majority of voters.

This would allow voters to vote for their first choice knowing that if their first choice was not amongst the top vote recipients their vote would be transferred to their second choice and not become a de facto vote for the candidate they least liked. Strategic voting would be eliminated and all candidates would know how much real first ballot support they had and candidates would not be penalized because the media tells everyone they do not have a chance.

This type of system, of course, would not just work in municipal elections. Indeed, this is the type of system that the United Kingdom is going to hold a referendum on.

Using such a system in Ontario municipal elections would be an excellent place for us to start. While it is likely too late to introduce in this years election it may very well not be too late to add a question to the ballot in the November election to find out what voters think of the system.

My Referendum Quandary

What to do about the referendum. While i believe we need electoral reform I would prefer a preferential ballot system to a proportional representation system, as stated in a previous Fifth Column. My quandary is that if I vote yes in the referendum question and it is approved will it shut the door forever on a preferential ballot system and if I vote no and it fails will the likelihood of electoral reform of any kind be nil.

The answer of course is obvious. Looking at these questions rather than the ballot question itself is the same as strategic voting, which is what I believe to be the biggest problem with the current system. The simple question is whether I prefer the status quo or the proposed alternative. No other questions are on the ballot.

Do We Need Electoral Reform

Is our system of representative government broken. Does it require fixing.

Some will argue that, because the representation of parties in our legislatures does not represent their percentage of support overall within the country or the province, all people and ideas are not being represented. They may have a point, but if we accept that how do we fix it and retain a representative system. Do we want to retain a representative system.

The value of representative government is that our representatives are more than just legislators, they are representatives of communities. We do not just vote for party leaders or parties but for someone to represent our community. Our elected representatives act as our link to government, not just as legislators but as information conduits in both directions, from and to government. Much of a representative’s time is spent in an ombudsman role in what is referred to as “constituency work” and this work involves dealing with the elected government, Cabinet Ministers, as well as with the Public Service.

Most of the proposals for proportional representation involve party lists and two classes of representatives, some representing local communities (constituencies), and some selected overall from the party lists.

Do we want to have two classes of representatives. Do we want to have a system that puts even more emphasis on voting for the party and party leader than the local representative.

Or should we expect someone wanting to get elected to have to convince a majority in their local community to vote for them.

We do have a problem. The problem is what most call “strategic voting”, but what is really “negative voting” - choosing who to vote for based on who you do not want to get elected rather than who you want to get elected. It involves people not voting for their first choice but for the least worse of those they think have the best chance to win. Fear that the “wrong” person will be elected appears to be stronger than the desire that the “right” person be elected.

This practice does more to prevent independents or representatives of newer or “minor” parties from getting elected than the structure of the system itself.

There is a solution. It involves allowing people to vote for their first choice without “losing” their vote and it means all representatives will be elected by over fifty percent of voters in their community.

Voters will vote preferentially for as many candidates as they like. If they only want to vote for one candidate they only indicate a first choice, otherwise they will indicate their choices in order of preference for as many candidates as they choose. Votes will be transferred from candidates receiving the least number of votes to the voters next preference until one candidate receives over fifty percent of the votes.

I predict that such a system would result in a reduction in the imbalance between parties overall popular vote and percentage of elected representatives and will also see an increase in the number of independents elected, something that proportional representation proposals do not address.

In this age of electronic voting it is an idea whose time has come.

As for proportional representation, if we are not prepared to abolish the Senate, it might be an interesting experiment to try with the Senate.