Sorting The Canadian Senate

If I had my choice I would simply abolish the Canadian Senate but that would require a constitutional amendment and open a whole new Canadian proverbial can of worms.

However as far as the selection of Senators other than set regional distribution the only requirement is that they be summoned by the Governor General.

Summons of Senator

24 The Governor General shall from Time to Time, in the Queen’s Name, by Instrument under the Great Seal of Canada, summon qualified Persons to the Senate; and, subject to the Provisions of this Act, every Person so summoned shall become and be a Member of the Senate and a Senator. (Constitution Act, 1867 )

This means that Parliament is free to legislate the process of the selection of Senators by the Governor General however they wish.

Many would suggest an elected Senate, but besides the issues with constitutional wording that strongly implies the Senate must be appointed, the Constitution also provides a regional representation that does not reflect representation by population. An elected Senate might try to claim legitimacy it does not have to overrule or thwart the will of the House of Commons leading to a potential constitutional crises. There is no need for two elected Houses though there may be a need to make the House of Commons more representative through a system of proportional representation.

So how do we make the Senate more effective.

The Senate’s traditional role has been as a place of sober second thought in regards to ensuring the soundness of legislation originating in the House of Commons. Senatecommittees have also taken on the role of studying the issues of the day and issuing reports.

These roles do overlap with the House of Commons functions so how can we make the Senate better complement the role of the House of Commons. The current government has attempted, and succeeded to a degree, to make the Senate a less partisan body than the House of Commons but it is still by virtue of the type of people appointed a political body with appointment until retirement at age 75 (or earlier at the Senator’s choice).

What if we made the Senate representative of the Canadian public in a different way than election or appointment by the government of the day, with shorter terms.

What if we selected Senators randomly in a similar manner to selecting jurors taking into account the regional representation requirements. This is not a new concept, it even has a name.

Sortition

In governance, sortition is the selection of public officials or jurors at random, i.e. by lottery, in order to obtain a representative sample.[1][2][3][4] (Wikipedia)

Implementing sortition for the Canadian Senate will not be completely random and representative because of the geographic requirements and because many people will not accept the post for various legitimate reasons but it will still provide a different perspective than the House of Commons because the membership will mostly consist of non-politically active citizens.

I would propose appointment for a four year term with half of the Senate changing every two years so there is always fifty percent membership with some experience. Unlike a few weeks commitment for jury duty this would be too long a commitment to make it mandatory.

There would need to be some mandatory exclusions such as anyone holding public office and probably also judges and I would also exclude lawyers. Others might request exclusion because it might affect their career prospects negatively or they might have other obligations.

Fortunately the one group that most lacks representation now, the unemployed and underemployed or those with precarious employment would likely welcome a guaranteed four years of employment, with the bonus of being able to serve their fellow citizens.

A sorted Senate might be the unique Canadian solution we are looking for.

The Senate Must Reject Bill C-10s “Censorship” Provisions

Much has been written about the “censorship” provisions in Bill C-10. One might argue that it is not “censorship” but just the government setting standards for what it is willing to fund with taxpayers money. However, as others have pointed out, here are already provisions that prevent “pornography” from being funded. This is much more odious than that.

It is one thing to say the government will not fund “objectionable” content. It is another to say it will only fund content that promotes the goals of the governing party. That is what this provision allows and even mandates.

The key wording in Bill C-10 is the following phrase used to describe what the government would fund:

“(b) public financial support of the production would not be contrary to public policy”

Note the careful choice of words. We are not talking about the “public interest” but about “public policy”. What is “public policy”. What other interpretation could there be other than that it refers to “government policy”, and “government policy” is established by the party in power and changes as governments change.

At best, it is so ambiguous that film and television producers would never know if a film or television program would be eligible for funding or not. At worse, the government would be mandated not to provide public funding to films or programs that are contrary to Conservative Party policy.

Of course the government will argue that is not what it means. If so, why is that what it says.

At least one Member of the House of Commons has admitted to voting for Bill C-10 without knowing that provision was there. That is not surprising. The provision is well hidden in a 600 page tax bill. Simply for the reason that Members of Parliament were not aware of this clause, the Senate should send it back to the House of Commons for reconsideration.

Never Believe The Press - At Least Not The Toronto Star

Yesterday in the Fifth Column, in relation to the government’s alleged non-confidence motion aimed at pressuring the Senate to pass Bill C-22 quickly, I stated:

The question of whether declaring this meaningless motion a matter of confidence makes it a non-confidence motion is moot, however, as the Bloc Quebecois and New Democratic Party have indicated that they will support the motion.”

This statement was based on an article in the Toronto Star dated “Feb 08, 2008 04:30 AM” that stated:

The first deadline, in the form of a motion introduced yesterday, will call on the Commons next week to demand that the Liberal- dominated Senate pass Bill C-2, the government's omnibus "Tackling Violent Crime" legislation.

Bloc Québécois Leader Gilles Duceppe and NDP Leader Jack Layton indicated their parties would happily support the Conservatives in pressuring the Senate to pass the crime bill.

However that statement turned out to be false as the CBC reported:

Even without the Liberals, the motion easily passed 172-27, with the Conservatives and Bloc Québécois MPs voting in its favour and New Democrat MPs voting against it.

The Fifth Column apologies to the NDP. I should have known better than to believe they would support such a motion.

Non-Confidence & A Meaningless Motion

The following motion is to be voted on today following Question Period:

Mr. Van Loan (Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister for Democratic Reform), seconded by Mr. Nicholson (Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada)

That, given the Government has declared the passage of Bill C-2, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, as a matter of confidence, and, that the bill has already been at the Senate longer than all stages took in the House of Commons, and that all aspects of this bill have already been the subject of extensive committee hearings in Parliament, and that in the opinion of this House, the Senate majority is not providing appropriate priority to the passage of Bill C-2, a message be sent to the Senate calling on the Senate to pass Bill C-2, the Tackling Violent Crime Act, by March 1, 2008. (Government Business No. 3)

This is part of an attempt by the government to set up a series of opportunities to lose motions of confidence, which also includes the budget and the motion on the Afghanistan motion. While the government is justified in declaring the vote on Bill C-2 in the House of Commons a matter of confidence, this motion is meaningless and hardly a matter of confidence.

This motion is meaningless as the House of Commons has no authority over the Senate and no constitutional right to provide direction to it.

The confidence convention requires that the government retain the confidence of the House of Commons, not the confidence of the Senate.

• Compendium
• Procedure Online
• House of Commons

Parliamentary Framework
Confidence Convention

By constitutional convention, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet are able to exercise authority only with the consent and approval (“confidence”) of a majority of the Members of the House of Commons. Should the Government lose the confidence of the House, the Prime Minister must submit his or her resignation to the Governor General, who either calls an election, or, much more rarely, invites the leader of another party in the House to attempt to form a government.

The confidence convention is a matter of parliamentary practice and tradition that is not written into any statute or Standing Order of the House, nor is it a matter on which the Speaker can rule. However, confidence motions are generally considered to be:

* explicitly worded motions which state, in precise terms, that the House of Commons has, or has not, confidence in the government;
* motions expressly declared by the government to be questions of confidence;
* implicit motions of confidence, that is, motions traditionally deemed to be questions of confidence, such as motions for the granting of Supply (although not necessarily an individual item of Supply), motions concerning the budgetary policy of the government and motions respecting the Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne.

The question of whether declaring this meaningless motion a matter of confidence makes it a non-confidence motion is moot, however, as the Bloc Quebecois and New Democratic Party have indicated that they will support the motion. Whether the motion has any moral suasion over the Senate is for it to decide,

Any decisions by the Senate on Bill C-2, including extending debate on it, are not matters of confidence. The only way Bill C-2 can be a matter of confidence is for it to be defeated in the House of Commons.