Municipal Elections Suck

So why do municipal elections suck.

Because the way the system works now all too often the least preferred candidate wins rather than the most preferred candidate.

This results from the fact that there are often a large number of candidates, many of whom may share a similar philosophy and similar policies and who appeal to the same group of voters. For simplicity sake lets divide the candidates (and voters) into alphas and betas, for want of better terms.

Various scenarios can come into play here but for demonstration purposes lets look at a simple one. Let us say there are three alpha candidates that share 60% of the vote roughly and one beta candidate with 40% of the vote. Let us assume, reasonably, that the beta candidate is the last choice of almost all of the alpha voters. And let us assume, also reasonably, that while all the alpha voters may have individual preferences all the alpha candidates are acceptable to almost all of the alpha voters.

Under our present electoral system the beta candidate, the last choice of the majority of voters and the one acceptable to only a minority of voters would get elected. Similar situations can happen with different numbers of candidates and different breakdowns with either beta or alpha candidates benefiting from the flaw in the system.

Another effect of this of course is that people realize this is happening and "strategic voting" comes into play and voters attempt to avoid this by voting for their second or third choices instead of their first, depending on who the media says has the best chance of winning. Such a situation deprives voters of the ability to vote for their first choice and gives the media an inordinate (and undemocratic) amount of power in choosing who gets elected.

There is an alternative - system that allows voters to vote for their first choice amongst acceptable candidates and not vote for unacceptable candidates. Instead of voting for one candidate you would rank the candidates in order of preference, ranking as many candidates as you wish and avoiding ranking unacceptable candidates if you do not wish to. The votes would be tabulated electronically dropping the bottom candidates from the list and redistributing their votes to the voters next choice until a candidate receives over 50% of the vote.

Under this system the least preferred candidate would never be elected and the elected candidate would always be acceptable to the majority of voters.

This would allow voters to vote for their first choice knowing that if their first choice was not amongst the top vote recipients their vote would be transferred to their second choice and not become a de facto vote for the candidate they least liked. Strategic voting would be eliminated and all candidates would know how much real first ballot support they had and candidates would not be penalized because the media tells everyone they do not have a chance.

This type of system, of course, would not just work in municipal elections. Indeed, this is the type of system that the United Kingdom is going to hold a referendum on.

Using such a system in Ontario municipal elections would be an excellent place for us to start. While it is likely too late to introduce in this years election it may very well not be too late to add a question to the ballot in the November election to find out what voters think of the system.

Do We Need Electoral Reform

Is our system of representative government broken. Does it require fixing.

Some will argue that, because the representation of parties in our legislatures does not represent their percentage of support overall within the country or the province, all people and ideas are not being represented. They may have a point, but if we accept that how do we fix it and retain a representative system. Do we want to retain a representative system.

The value of representative government is that our representatives are more than just legislators, they are representatives of communities. We do not just vote for party leaders or parties but for someone to represent our community. Our elected representatives act as our link to government, not just as legislators but as information conduits in both directions, from and to government. Much of a representative’s time is spent in an ombudsman role in what is referred to as “constituency work” and this work involves dealing with the elected government, Cabinet Ministers, as well as with the Public Service.

Most of the proposals for proportional representation involve party lists and two classes of representatives, some representing local communities (constituencies), and some selected overall from the party lists.

Do we want to have two classes of representatives. Do we want to have a system that puts even more emphasis on voting for the party and party leader than the local representative.

Or should we expect someone wanting to get elected to have to convince a majority in their local community to vote for them.

We do have a problem. The problem is what most call “strategic voting”, but what is really “negative voting” - choosing who to vote for based on who you do not want to get elected rather than who you want to get elected. It involves people not voting for their first choice but for the least worse of those they think have the best chance to win. Fear that the “wrong” person will be elected appears to be stronger than the desire that the “right” person be elected.

This practice does more to prevent independents or representatives of newer or “minor” parties from getting elected than the structure of the system itself.

There is a solution. It involves allowing people to vote for their first choice without “losing” their vote and it means all representatives will be elected by over fifty percent of voters in their community.

Voters will vote preferentially for as many candidates as they like. If they only want to vote for one candidate they only indicate a first choice, otherwise they will indicate their choices in order of preference for as many candidates as they choose. Votes will be transferred from candidates receiving the least number of votes to the voters next preference until one candidate receives over fifty percent of the votes.

I predict that such a system would result in a reduction in the imbalance between parties overall popular vote and percentage of elected representatives and will also see an increase in the number of independents elected, something that proportional representation proposals do not address.

In this age of electronic voting it is an idea whose time has come.

As for proportional representation, if we are not prepared to abolish the Senate, it might be an interesting experiment to try with the Senate.